At one time almost all of the data input into computers was provided by key strokes and most actuators controlled by computers were for storage and printering.  By stages this has changed.  For instance, in the power grid, electromechanical relays were replaced by computers which were then attached to digital networks to form Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) networks in which the relays act as sensors to collect telemetry (power readings) and as actuators to control the flow of electricity.  This trend has been repeated in many areas and the deployment and exploitation of networked sensors to collect data and networked commands to provide automated and remote control is now commonplace.

Networked sensors and control introduce new security considerations because of the need to protect communication channels, central points of failure (such as SCADA control centers), and the exposure of remotely located units to attackers (such as field units that can be physically accessed).    At the same time there is increasing reliance on such systems for safety-critical and economically-critical functions.  For instance, surveillance and metering systems are used to protect assets in transit or in remote facilities and compromising their software or hardware would provide strategies for theft.  Other controls like those for power grid substations control functions on which many other systems depend so attackers such as publicity-seekers and terrorists may be motivated to exploit vulnerabilities.

Our work in this area is concerned primarily with security architectures for networked sensors and control systems, especially in the areas of power and Building Automation Systems (BASs).   These projects explore the balance between reliance on perimeter protection systems and the security of edge systems, challenges for protecting privacy while assuring the integrity of monitored data, and strategies for preserving the availability of digital control systems when they are connected to enterprise networks or the Internet.

Working Projects

• Attested Metering
• Building Automation Middleware (BAM)
• Secure Intelligent Electronic Devices (SIEDs)

Resources

• Introduction to DNP3 protocol
• Introduction to ICCP protocol
• Introduction to IEC 61850
  

Related Links

• Links to SCADA Security Resources
• Attested Meter Blog
• TCIP: Trustworthy Cyber Infrastructure for the Power Grid
• TCIP TWiki (password required)